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et al.: Evidence

EVIDENCE
I.

RULINGS ON IN LIMINE MOTIONS NOT FINAL DETERMINATIONS ON
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

In State v. Floyd' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
rulings on in limine motions to suppress evidence' are not final determinations on the admissibility of evidence. The traditional source of
authority for these motions is neither statutory nor common law, but is
derived from the authority of a trial court to admit or exclude evidence3
and to take any necessary precautions to afford all parties a fair trial
Supreme Court precePrior to Floyd there existed no South Carolina
4
limine.
in
motions
of
finality
the
on
dent
Appellant Terri Raye Floyd was charged with assault and battery
upon her eight-month-old daughter, Nicole. Floyd allegedly immersed
the child in a tub of scalding water. At a pre-trial in limine hearing,
Floyd advised the court that on cross-examination the state might
challenge the credibility of two of Floyd's witnesses, Ralph and Janice
Marcum. More specifically, Floyd anticipated the state would reveal
that, in a family court adjudication, the Department of Social Services
(DSS) had removed two of the Marcums' minor children from their
custody. The DSS investigator involved in the Marcum case also participated in the Floyd case and was expected to be a key witness for
the state. The state argued this prior custody proceeding had created
animosity in the Marcums toward DSS and especially toward the investigator involved.5
The trial court orally granted the defense's motion in limine, allowing the state to elicit testimony from the Marcums that there was
"bad blood" between the witnesses, but precluding the state from revealing the circumstances which led to the animosity. At trial, however,
Janice Marcum denied on cross-examination that she harbored any ill

1. 295 S.C. 518, 369 S.E.2d 842 (1988).

2. An in limine motion to suppress evidence is a pretrial procedural device used
to prevent potentially prejudicial evidence from coming to the attention of the jury
before the court can make a ruling on its admissibility. The motion requests the court to
issue a pretrial order enjoining opposing counsel from using such evidence in the jury's

presence at trial. Rothblatt, The Motion in Limine in Criminal Trials:A Technique for
the PretrialExclusion of PrejudicialEvidence, 60 Ky. L.J. 611, 613-14 (1972).
3. Id. at 614-15.
4. Floyd, 295 S.C. at 520, 369 S.E.2d at 843.
5. Id. at 519-520, 369 S.E.2d at 843.
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will toward Ms. Jenkins. Consequently, the court found the facts sufficiently changed to justify altering the in limine ruling to allow the
state to question Ms. Marcum on the events which allegedly would establish the bad feelings. Floyd contended this action constituted reversible error because it violated the in limine ruling.6
Floyd primarily relied on State v. Smith7 to argue that a ruling on
a motion in limine can be a final ruling on admissibility.' Offering a
strained reading of Smith,9 Floyd argued that some rulings on motions
in limine are preliminary and some absolute, the determination of

which affects their finality. 10 Conversely, the state, citing State v.
the motion in limine rests
Goodstein," argued that the finality of
12
court.
trial
the
of
discretion
the
within
While the Washington decision upon which Floyd relied arguably

supported the proposition that a ruling on a motion in limine is an
absolute determination of admissibility, the Washington court cur-

rently does not support that assertion.' 3 Additionally, states which allow in limine motions on the admissibility of evidence generally hold
them to be interlocutory in nature.14 Consequently, by adopting the

6. Id.
7. 189 Wash. 422, 65 P.2d 1075 (1937).
8. See Brief of Appellant at 2.
9. During the Smith trial, on a motion by the defense, counsel for the state disregarded an order not to cross-examine a witness on a particular matter and proceeded
with his questioning. Although no objection had been made to the questioning at the
time of trial, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion for a new
trial. In reversing, the court stated that in light of counsel's deliberate disregard for the
court's order, prejudice must be presumed and a new trial should have been granted. See
Smith, 189 Wash. at 429, 65 P.2d at 1078.
10. See Brief of Appellant at'2. Floyd's assertion that rulings can be "prohibitiveabsolute" or "prohibitive-preliminary" has some support. Such a determination, however, turns upon the langauge used and the type of pretrial order sought from the court.
See Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 615. In Floyd neither Floyd's motion nor the court's
order was specific.
11. 278 S.C. 125, 292 S.E.2d 791 (1982) (conclusiveness of a pretrial motion to suppress is largely within the discretion of the trial court).
12. See Brief of Respondent at 9.
13. See State v. Austin, 34 Wash. App. 625, 662 P.2d 872 (1983) (proper function of
motion in limine is not to obtain final ruling on admissibility), aff'd sub nom. State v.
Koloske, 100 Wash. 2d 889, 676 P.2d 456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988).
14. See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 516 So. 2d 812 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (reconsideration
of a motion in limine will not be disturbed unless manifest abuse is shown), rev'd on
other grounds, 516 So. 2d 816 (1987); Blackburn v. State, 314 So. 2d 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (presumption of correctness attaches to court's reconsideration of a ruling on
an in limine motion), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 603, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976);
Henley v. State, 169 Ga. App. 682, 682, 314 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1984) (trial court can modify ruling on motion in limine to prevent "manifest injustice"); Lagenour v. State, 268
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majority view, the South Carolina Supreme Court wisely recognized
that in limine motions do not constitute final determinations on the
admissibility of evidence.
Although not addressed by the court, an in limine motion should
not be a final determination on the admissibility of evidence for several
important reasons. First, the pretrial court may not be attuned fully to
the issues which will be most crucial at trial. Second, the pretrial court
may not be fully knowledgeable of facts when it renders its decision.
Third, as in Floyd, situations may develop at trial which, in fairness to
all parties, require a change in the court's ruling. Finally, when re-evaluating the motion during the trial, the court can better judge the probative value and the potential prejudice of the evidence, as well as determine other factors, such as the effect of the previous ruling on
counsel's strategy. By its interlocutory nature the motion still alerts
the court to the potential for harm and, therefore, can prevent the introduction of evidence before its prejudicial effect can be properly
evaluated.
The South Carolina Supreme Court also did not have to address
whether evidence introduced at trial, which had previously been objected to by a motion in limine, must be objected to at the time of its
introduction in order to preserve error. The majority of courts that
have considered this issue have required that the objection be made at
trial to preserve the error. 15 Presumably, the minority reason that requiring opposing counsel to object to potentially prejudicial evidence
would focus further attention on such evidence. Nonetheless, many
courts have ruled that a timely objection must be made at trial.16
The motion as now applied in South Carolina and most other

Ind. 441, 376 N.E.2d 475 (1978) (it is not the office of a motion in limine to obtain final
ruling on the admissibility of evidence); State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 1971)
(trial court's order on motion in limine should prevent disclosure of evidence to jury
until court, during trial, can rule upon admissibility); State v. Evans, 639 S.W.2d 820
(Mo. 1982) (granting of motion in limine does not automatically result in permanent
exclusion of evidence sought to be excluded), afl'd per curiam, 687 S.W.2d 634 (1985);
State v. Spahr, 47 Ohio App. 2d 221, 353 N.E.2d 624 (1976) (no finality on motion in
limine is decided until trial is completed).

15. See, e.g., State v. Austin, 34 Wash. App. 625, _, 662 P.2d 872, 874 (1983) (citing Gamble, The Motion in Limine: A PretrialProcedure That Has Come of Age, 33
ALA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1981)), aff'd sub nom. State v. Koloske, 100 Wash. 2d 889, 676 P.2d
456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d

588 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Lagenour v. State, 268 Ind. 441, 376 N.E.2d 475 (1978) (evidence
sought to be excluded by motion in limine must be objected to at time of introduction at

trial to preserve any error in denial of the motion); State v. Evans, 639 S.W.2d 820 (Mo.
1982) (when trial court alters ruling on in limine motion and allows introduction of evidence, objection must be made at trial to preserve any error for appellate review).
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states is a useful tool for preventing prejudicial information from coming to the jury's attention before the court rules upon its admissibility.
However, since the South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet ruled
whether the introduction of evidence which was previously the subject
of an in limine ruling must be objected to at trial to preserve any potential error on appeal, prudent attorneys will raise such an objection.
Frank C. Williams III

II.

PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF

HOMOSEXUALITY LIMITED
In State v. Diddlemeyer17 the South Carolina Supreme Court once
again defined limits on prosecutorial comments and the admission of
evidence related to a defendant's homosexuality. The court reversed
and remanded Diddlemeyer's murder conviction on four grounds.
First, the appellant's court appointed counsel failed to meet attorney experience requirements defined in South Carolina Code section
16-3-26(B). 8 The court avoided ruling on the constitutionality of failure to meet the statutory mandates. Instead, it found the record was so
flawed with improperly admitted testimony and unpreserved exceptions that the attorney's lack of experience had denied Diddlemeyer a
fair trial.19
The court cited United States v. Blankenship" for the proposition that violation of a statutory right to effective counsel does not
automatically mandate reversal. 1 The court, however, did not expressly endorse the Fourth Circuit's opinion and left to speculation
whether it would find that such a statutory deficiency violated the defendant's right to effective counsel. 22 Irrespective of the constitutional
issue, the court is likely to continue to scrutinize closely the trial record for evidence that an attorney's failure to meet statutory experience
requirements led to errors that denied the defendant a fair trial.
Second, the court held that testimony of Diddlemeyer's accomplice
regarding their homosexual relationship had no bearing on any issue
and should not have been admitted.23 The state introduced the testimony to support its contention that the accomplice was compelled to

17. 296 S.C. 235, 371 S.E.2d 793 (1988).
18. See S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988).
19. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. at 238, 371 S.E.2d at 795.

20. 548 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 978 (1976).
21. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. at 238, 371 S.E.2d at 794.
22. See id., 371 S.E.2d at 794-95.
23. Id. at 234, 371 S.E.2d at 795.
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cooperate with Diddlemeyer because of their relationship." Quoting
State v. Hartfield,25 the court explained that society's general disdain
for homosexuality causes such evidence, introduced for any reason
other than to prove a fact at issue, to become an attack on the defendant's character.26 Since the testimony was not related to a fact at issue,
it was impermissible character evidence and should have been excluded. The court found additional support for the exclusion of evidence in South Carolina cases excluding evidence of prior criminal acts
unconnected with present charges against the defendant.2 7 The court's
ruling on this issue is consistent with its ruling in Hartfield. Diddlemeyer presents an even stronger case for exclusion than Hartfield,
in which evidence of a homosexual relationship between the defendant
and the victim was erroneously admitted.
Third, the solicitor's indirect references to the defendant's silence
at trial were held to have violated Diddlemeyer's constitutional rights
under the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. 8 The court held
the solicitor's sentencing phase argument, referring to Diddlemeyer's
lack of remorse, was an impermissible reference to his silence at trial
and constituted reversible error.2 9 The court cited several South Carolina cases reversing murder convictions when a solicitor referred to a
defendant as having shown no remorse. 30 In cases in which improper
prosecutorial remarks occurred only during the sentencing phase, as in
Diddlemeyer, the error was only one of several grounds for reversal.
Although the court implied that improper sentencing phase arguments
constitute grounds for reversal of a conviction, impermissible comments made during the sentencing phase could have no effect on the
rights of the defendant during the guilt phase of the trial. Standing
alone, these comments would require resentencing, but would not logically constitute grounds for reversal of the conviction.
In prior cases, the court has emphasized the solicitor's role as an
administrator of justice rather than a procurer of convictions. 31 The

24. Id.
25. 272 S.C. 407, 411, 252 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1979).

26. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. at 239, 371 S.E.2d at 795.
27. See id. (citing State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987); State v.

Smith, 279 S.C. 440, 308 S.E.2d 794 (1983); State v. Green, 261 S.C. 366, 200 S.E.2d 74
(1973)).
28. Id. at 239-40, 371 S.E.2d at 795.

29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317); State v. Hawkins, 292 S.C.

418, 357 S.E.2d 10 (1987); State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 347 S.E.2d 882 (1986); see also
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) (court condemned solicitor's reference to
appellant's post-Mirandawarning silence as evidence of appellant's sanity).
31. See, e.g., State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 312, 278 S.E.2d 335, 339 (1981); State v.
Allen, 266 S.C. 468, 487, 224 S.E.2d 881, 888 (1976).
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court has repeatedly reminded solicitors to confine their remarks to the
facts of the case, its reasonable inferences, and appropriate characteristics of the defendant. 2 This ruling reaffirms the court's continuing
commitment to protect a defendant's rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Finally, the court held that it was error to admit into evidence the
plea agreement of Diddlemeyer's accomplice without any limiting instructions as to jury use.3 3 Because the agreement included the solicitor's opinion of Diddlemeyer's culpability, the opinion also was entered
into evidence. Relying on its decision in State v. Woomer,34 the court
held that allowing admission of the solicitor's opinion interjected an
arbitrary factor into the jury's deliberations.3 5 It potentially gave jurors
an impression that the solicitor's office formed its opinion of Diddlemeyer's role in the murder based on an independent investigation. 6
As a result, the court held that introduction of this evidence required
at least a limiting
instruction to the jury regarding the plea agree37
ment's purpose.
The court's original opinion cited as additional error the solicitor's

32. See State v. Cockerham, 294 S.C. 380, 383, 365 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1988) (per
curiam) (citing State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515, 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987)). The solicitor in Cockerham asked the jury to "imagine what kind of mood that young man was in the night
the victim was killed, as he sits here today quiet as can be." Id. at 381, 365 S.E.2d at 22.
He later argued:
That night, February 9th, Dean Cockerham conducted a trial, much like the
trial we are having here, in some ways, and in some ways very far from it,
because [the victim's] Constitutional Rights and the rights to a trial by jury
didn't do much for her that night, because on that night, he was her judge, he
was her jury, and he was her executioner. And she didn't have a right to...
be represented by a lawyer. She didn't have a right to independent people on
her jury.
Id. at 381-82, 365 S.E.2d at 23.
Later, during the penalty phase, the solicitor instructed the jury to look at Cockerham to see if he looked sorry or exhibited any remorse. He then attempted to arouse
the jury's passion with the following remarks:
And he's going to do everything he can through his attorneys to take advantage
of your caring, and your softness, and that softness which creates an inability
to do something difficult like, you should be sentenced to death. He's not soft,
but he depends on your soft underbelly, your lack of courage, your lack of
commitment to get out of what he's into.
Id. at 383, 365 S.E.2d at 23 (emphasis supplied by the court).
33. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. at 240-41, 371 S.E.2d at 796.
34. 278 S.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 317 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983) (death
sentence is not free of arbitrary factors when solicitor's opinion of defendant's guilt is
before jury as evidence).
35. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. at 240, 371 S.E.2d at 796.
36. Id. at 240-41, 371 S.E.2d at 796.
37. Id. at 241, 371 S.E.2d at 796.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss1/8

6

1989]

etEVIDENCE
al.: Evidence

sentencing phase argument extolling the death penalty's deterrent effects.," The court initially held the solicitor's comments39 violated the

defendant's due process rights by introducing an arbitrary factor into
the jury's sentencing deliberations.40 The state petitioned for rehearing
on this issue, arguing that the solicitor's comments were within the
guidelines set in earlier cases by the South Carolina Supreme Court."1
The state distinguished the solicitor's comments from attempts to introduce specific evidence regarding the deterrent effects of capital punishment,"2 which were proscribed by the court in State v. Plath43 and
State v. Woomer.4 4 The petition was denied, but the court implicitly
adopted the state's position by withdrawing its original opinion and
issuing another. The current opinion does not address this issue.
The court's implicit decision to allow solicitors to argue the deterrent effects of capital punishment is consistent with earlier South Carolina cases. 45 Looking closely at the content of the solicitor's argument
in Diddlemeyer, however, raises the question of whether such an argument diverts the jury's attention from the defendant's culpability and
focuses instead on the defendant's potential value as an example to
others. In its petition, the state cited United States Supreme Court

38. See State v. Diddlemeyer, No. 22861, slip op. at 10 (S.C. Ct. App. April 11,
1988), amended on denial of reh'g, 296 S.C. 235, 371 S.E.2d 793 (1988).
39. The solicitor argued:
Why do we have a death penalty law? You know some people may say, well, to
deter crime. Does it not? It'll certainly deter Diddlemeyer. And, you know,
when you talk about the death penalty and the deterring effect, they've got
lighthouses and they've got one right down here at McClellanville and the light
spins around an [sic] you say, well, we don't know how many ships would crash
on the shore in the middle of the night if it wasn't for the lighthouse, but you
do know the purpose of that lighthouse. It's up there to warn, don't come too
close, don't come too close, it's dangerous. And so is there not a warning under
the death penalty law to say to people, you don't come to Horry County and
take out insurance policies on a human being and kill him. You don't do that
because if you do that you are going to suffer the ultimate punishment. Don't
come here, don't do that.
Record at 1179.
40. Id.
41. See State's Petition for Rehearing at 2, State v. Diddlemeyer (citing State v.
Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983), vacated sub
nom. Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896 (1985); State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 212 S.E.2d 587
(1975)).
42. See id.
43. 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619, cert. denied sub nom. Arnold v. South Carolina, 467
U.S. 1265 (1984).
44. 278 S.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 317 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983).
45. See State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1124 (1983), vacated sub nom. Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896 (1985); State v. Durden, 264
S.C. 86, 212 S.E.2d 587 (1975).
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decisions recognizing deterrence as one of the goals of capital punishment.4 e The cited cases, however, do not stand for the proposition that
deterrence should be considered in an individual sentencing
proceeding.
Although a recognized justification for capital punishment, it does
not logically follow that deterrence should be a jury's primary consideration in deciding whether an individual defendant deserves the death
penalty. 47 Justice Bussey, concurring in State v. Durden,48 urged the
court to consider the precise language used by solicitors and the context of the argument in making its determination. 49 As for the question
of when a solicitor's argument, focusing on the value of capital punishment, so arouses a jury's passion and prejudice that the defendant's
culpability becomes lost in a perceived need to send society a message,
the court in State v. Diddlemeyer left that question unanswered.
Sandra L.W. Miller

III. EXPERIENCED SOCIAL WORKERS WHO OBSERVE VICTIM HELD
QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY AS EXPERT WITNESSES

Many cases hinge on matters which elude the experience or education of juries. This problem necessitates testimony from expert wit0
nesses. In Honea v. Prior"
the South Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the role social workers often play in assault cases and accordingly
held that social workers may be qualified as expert witnesses as to the
mental conditions of victims.
The Aiken County Common Pleas Court found William Franklin
Prior, a physician, liable for damages for sexually assaulting his patient, Patti Honea. During the course of the trial, the judge allowed
two social workers to testify as expert witnesses concerning Honea's
mental condition. Both social workers had earned master's degrees in
social work, received further training in the subject of sexual assault,
treated sexual assault victims for many years, and had seen Honea sev-

46. State's Petition for Rehearing at 3, State v. Diddlemeyer (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
47. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 180-81; (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent suggests
that the justifications for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, have inadequate
self-limitations. Unfettered by the Constitution, such principles could logically support
human torture. Id. at 180. The eighth amendment serves to impose those limitations by
limiting the state's ability to punish offenders in a way that is disproportionate to the
individual's own conduct and culpability.
48. 264 S.C. 86, 212 S.E.2d 587 (1975).

49. See id. at 93-94, 212 S.E.2d at 591 (Bussey, J., concurring).
50. 295 S.C. 526, 369 S.E.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1988).
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eral times."'
On appeal, Prior claimed the trial judge abused his discretion by
allowing the social workers to be qualified as experts to give psychiatric
diagnoses. The court rejected Prior's contention, noting that "[t]he
trial judge's determination regarding a witness' qualifications to testify
as an expert will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of an
abuse of discretion." 52 The court recognized that to qualify as an expert, the witness must have gained special knowledge about a subject,
but that knowledge need not come from academic study.5 3 It decided
the social workers in this case were not automatically disqualified because of their lack of medical training. The court stated, "Considering
each social worker's education, her post-graduate training, her clinical
experience with victims of sexual assault, and her opportunities to observe Honea, we hold the trial judge committed no abuse of discretion
in determining that each social worker was qualified as an expert
154

Honea is well decided. The decision is consistent with South Carolina law and, perhaps more importantly, is good policy. While the narrow issue of the ability of social workers to qualify as experts to give
psychiatric diagnoses is novel in this state, the principle is well established in South Carolina that qualifying a witness is a matter best left
to the discretion of the trial judge.5 5 The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate witnesses and is vested with wide discretion in qualifying experts, since witnesses are not required to have obtained expertise
through formal education. 56
In Howle v. PYAlMonarch, Inc.5 7 the court of appeals held that
the trial court did not abuse iti discretion by allowing a psychologist to
qualify as an expert to testify about a person's mental condition. The
court stated that "[a] psychologist is not incompetent to give his opinion simply because he is not a licensed medical doctor." 58 Since a psychologist can qualify as an expert, it certainly is not unreasonable to
permit a well-trained and experienced social worker to be similarly
qualified.

51. Id. at 529-30, 369 S.E.2d at 848.
52. Id. at 530, 369 S.E.2d at 849 (citing McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S.C. 523, 74 S.E.
386 (1912)).
53. Id.

54. Id. at 531, 369 S.E.2d at 849.
55. See, e.g., Bonapart v. Floyd, 291 S.C. 427, 354 S.E.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1987);

Campbell v. Paschal, 290 S.C. 1, 347 S.E.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1986); South Carolina Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Bacot, 280 S.C. 485, 313 S.E.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1984).

56. See Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 320 S.E.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1984).
57. 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1986).

58. Id. at 594, 344 S.E.2d at 161.
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While few states have addressed the issue of social worker qualification, many states have embraced the notion that "opinion evidence
upon an issue of mental condition is not. . . limited to the opinion of
physicians."5 9 Nonphysicians held qualified to testify often have been
psychologists. 6 0 Other jurisdictions have qualified witnesses who were
neither physicians nor psychologists to testify as to mental conditions,
particularly concerning sexual assault victims."' Thus, although few jurisdictions have considered specifically whether social workers may
give psychiatric diagnoses, South Carolina does not appear out of step
with states addressing comparable questions.
The strength of Honea is that it reflects today's necessary interaction between the fields of mental health and social work. With the increased number of rape crisis centers and clinics designed to treat sexual assault victims, social workers often are more accessible to victims
than psychiatrists. Additionally, social workers are more economically
accessible than psychiatrists. By allowing only psychiatrists to testify
as to mental conditions, courts would encourage testimony of professionals often not sought solely for treatment, but also in anticipation of
a court appearance.
Honea leaves some questions unanswered, however. Where is the
line to be drawn as to who may qualify? What basic qualities must one
possess to meet the threshold requirement and qualify as an expert to
testify about mental conditions? While no definite answers can be
given to these questions, it is clear that even if future South Carolina
courts require less formal training, they likely will continue to require
significant experience and opportunity for observation.
Margaret A. Chamberlain

59. 31 Am.JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 27 (1967).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Riggleman, 411 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1969); Reese v.
Naylor, 222 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); In re Marriage of Auer, 86 Ill.
App. 3d
84, 407 N.E.2d 1034 (1980); Kravinsky v. Glover, 263 Pa. Super. 8, 396 A.2d 1349 (1979);
Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex Ct. App. 1978).
61. See, e.g., People v. Stanley, 36 Cal. 3d 253, 681 P.2d 302, 203 Cal. Rptr. 461
(1984); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 730 P.2d 1069 (Ct. App. 1986); Onwan v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 536 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 685
P.2d 918 (1984); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or. App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978).
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